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Abstract 
The objective of this reseach is to test the phenomenon of flypaper effect in local 
governments in Aceh Province during 2008 to 2012. The research used panel data 
analysis. Technically, it regresses the independent variables of the local owned 
revenue and unconditional grants on dependent variable of public spending where 
the institutions as a moderating variable. The flypaper effect was found in the 
case of public and infrastructure expenditures. The study also found that the insti-
tution is capable to reduce the use of unconditional grants. It means that by the 
role of institution the local owned revenue can be optimized. 
 
Abstrak 
Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji apakah fenomena flypaper effect 
terjadi di pemerintah daerah kabupaten/kota di Provinsi Aceh selama tahun 2008 
sampai 2012. Metode analisis yang digunakan adalah regresi model data panel. 
Secara teknis penelitian ini meregres variabel independen yaitu Pendapatan Asli 
Daerah dan dana transfer terhadap variabel dependen yaitu belanja publik dan 
infrastruktur dimana variable kelembagaan digunakan sebagai variabel moderasi. 
Efek flypaper ditemukan dalam kasus pengeluaran public maupun infrastruktur. 
Studi ini juga menemukan bahwa factor kelembagaan mampu mengurangi peng-
gunaan dana transfer. Jadi peran kelembagaan dapat diharapkan untuk berperan 
dalam mengoptimalkan penerimaan Pendapatan Asli Daerah. 
 
 
Introduction 
The government of Indonesia effectively 
implemented Law No. 25 of 1999 on Fi-
nancial Balance between Central and Re-
gional Governments in 2001. The enforce-
ment of the law led Indonesia into a new 
era in fiscal decentralization and structural 
transformations, where in the earlier era the 
management of regional finance was more 
centralistic. Now it is more decentralized. 
The goal of this change is to create and de-
velop a public system that is capable for 
providing more effective and efficient local 
public goods and services by steadily main-
taining the macroeconomic stability. It is 
realized by transferring some authorities to 
make spending and to collect taxes to local 
governments and by providing grants in 
form of transfers from central government 
to local governments.  
The sources of funding for local 
government spending consists of PAD (Lo-
cal Owned Revenue), balancing fund, and 
other legal incomes. The PAD consists of 
local taxes, local user charges and other le-
gal revenues. Balancing fund is a local fund-
ing sourced from national budget that is 
consisting of Sharing Fund (DBH), General 
Allocation Fund (DAU), and Special Allo-
cation Fund (DAK). For Aceh Province, as 
shown on Table 1, during 2008-2012 it can 
be seen that the revenues of Aceh Provice 
sourcing from unconditional grant was in-
creasing as compared to the PAD. It means 
that Aceh’s local expenditures were predo-
minantly influenced by the contribution of 
unconditional grant. Thus, to enhance the 
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capacity of local governments in funding 
their expenditure, it urgently need to 
strenghten the local governments’ capacity 
in generating income from taxations. 
 
Table 1: Share of Provincial Unconditional 
Grant and PAD of the Total Local 
Expenditures 
 
Year 
Unconditional Grant 
 
PAD 
DAU DBH 
2008 46.87 35.55 12.63 
2009 77.93 24.44 13.97 
2010 62.08 22.66 12.94 
2011 77.02 24.42 11.02 
2012 81.24 14.00 10.33 
Source: Directorate General of Fiscal Balance, 
2012 
 
The predominance of transfer role 
relative to PAD in funding the local gov-
ernment expenditures had created such 
highly dependency of local government to 
this transfer fund. International empirical 
evidences show that the high dependence 
on transfer were negatively related to the 
outcome of the local government. It sug-
gests that local governments should be 
more wise in their expenditures sourcing 
from their local owned revenue rather than 
sourcing from the intergovernemntal trans-
fer fund (grant) from the central govern-
ment (Mello and Barenstrei, 2001).   
Flypaper effect is phenomenon to 
describe when a dollar of exogenous inter-
governmental fiscal transfer leads to signif-
icantly greater public spending than an 
equivalent dollar of citizen income: money 
sticks where it hits (Inman, 2008). Some 
other empirical studies of flypaper effect 
were conducted, e.g., Deller et. al., (2007) 
and Deller and Maher (2005) in America, 
Sagbas and Saruç (2004) in Turkey.  
Interestingly, however, a research 
by Maimunah and Akbar (2008) suggested 
that flypaper effect has been disclosed not 
only in local governments with lower PAD 
but also it happened in the local with higher 
PAD. Some of them wera found in some 
districts/municipalities in Sumatra. It indi-
cates that there are stronger factors such as 
politics in addition to other economic rea-
sons (Courant et al., 1979). The political 
factor in this case is local economic gover-
nance (institution) that greatly cause the 
occurrence of flypaper effect. Bailey and 
Stephen (1998) claimed that interest 
groups, rather than voters, are the major 
players in budgeting. The powers of pres-
sure groups certainly vary from one pro-
gram to another and thus the sizes of flypa-
per effect equally vary in accordance with 
the categories of expenditures.  
The basis of theoretical rationale 
was on flypaper effect. The flypaper effect 
phenomenon could be described as follows: 
a $1 increase in local owned revenue in-
come should has the same impact on public 
spending as receiving $1 in form of gener-
al-purposed transfer. In fact, however, all 
empirical studies show that the $1 received 
by communities in a form of general-
purposed transfer tends to be used to in-
crease local spending by increasing local 
owned revenue incomes of more than $1. 
Budget fund tends to stick where it is spent 
for the first time (money “sticks where it 
hits”), causing the part that is left for ac-
tually smaller tax relief than expected 
(Boadway and Shah, 2009). 
According to literature, there are 
two explanations for flypaper effect that 
rely on public choice reasoning, these are 
bureaucratic model and fiscal illusion. Bu-
reaucratic model suggests that flypaper ef-
fect is due to the behavior of bureaucrats 
that have more freedom to spend transfer 
funds than to raise taxes. McGuire (in Kun-
coro, 2007) labels it as politician greed. 
Therefore, flypaper effect occurs due to the 
superior knowledge of bureaucrat on trans-
fer funds. The more information that bu-
reaucrats have means that they may give 
more expenditures.  
On the other side, fiscal illusion 
model bases its study on the viewpoint of 
communities who have limited information 
26 	


 
on their regional government budget. Filli-
mon et. al (1982) developed a hypothesis of 
fiscal illusion in a context of community’s 
lack of knowledge on the amount of trans-
fer funds received by their local govern-
ment. In this case, regional governments 
hide the amount of transfer funds they re-
ceived from the central government and 
then they spent them to top level expendi-
tures that the community wants. 
Political economy literatures deal-
ing with governance are still in a process 
toward achieving a mutual agreement or 
consensus. Generally, governance is meant 
as traditions and institutions that decide 
how policies are implemented in a country 
(Kaufmann et. al., 2000). Weiss (2005) said 
that governance is related to strategies, 
processes, methods, and mechanisms in 
governing a country and fulfilling public 
demands and interests. Weiss maintained 
that good governance is related to democ-
racy and fulfillment of civil rights, transpa-
rency, rule of law, and efficient public ser-
vices. Governance also involves the inte-
ractions of public and private institutions 
with community. Likewise, Chibba (2009) 
explained that governance issues are part of 
people that have been integrated since the 
onset of civilization, and it particularly 
upholds certain values, ethics, and prevail-
ing rules, and justice to be enforced, and 
related to how people is governed and who 
shall hold powers and authorities.  
Moreover, North (1981) stated that 
institutions are community’s rule of game 
or, formally, the constraints occurring hu-
manly that create human interactions. The 
constraints is affected by force (North, 
1990). The force is intended for the eco-
nomic actors to accept the rule of game. 
Economists have developed North’s idea in 
order to create a drive for economic growth 
by using different perspectives. The cores 
of their goal are the same, e.g., to reduce 
uncertainty and enhance efficiency. New 
political economy, for example, resists the 
importance of structure adjusting programs 
by removing rent-seeking and corruption 
motives (Kuncoro, 2012). 
Literatures specifically deal with the 
relationship between institution and flypaper 
effect are still lacking. Bailey and Stephen 
developed a model where interest groups, 
not voters, are the key player in budgeting. 
The political powers of pressure groups cer-
tainly vary from one program to another, 
and thus the sizes of flypaper effect vary 
with the categories of expenditures. For 
Oates (1988), the political powers that 
emerge in budgeting processes are already 
sufficient to meet the theoretical norm for an 
occurrence of flypaper effect. Deller and 
Maher (2005) studied the categories of pub-
lic expenditures with a focus on the occur-
rence of flypaper effect and found that the 
effect of unconditional grant in the catego-
ries of expenditures is greater on nonessen-
tial needs or luxury needs such as parks and 
recreations, culture and educational services 
rather than on essential or normal needs 
such as security (police) and fire protection.  
Local owned revenue (PAD) is the 
own source of local revenues that should be 
constantly increased to be capable of bear-
ing a part of expenditure burden required for 
implementing governmental affairs and de-
velopment activities. It is expected to be 
steadily increasing year by year so that the 
self-sufficiency of broad, real, and responsi-
ble regional autonomy can be realized. The 
key characteristics of a local government 
that is capable in implementing its autono-
my may be characterized by regional finan-
cial capacity and dependency to central aid.  
Based on some empirical studies re-
lated to flypaper effect and their model, it 
could be seen as follows:  
1. Deller et. al. (2007) conducted a study 
of 581 cities and villages in Wisconsin 
by using a cross section for a time pe-
riod of 1987-2000 and used the follow-
ing model: 
PCE = 
0
 + 
1
 SSRPC + 
2
 PCI + e 
where, PCE is regional expenditures, 
SSRPC is (interregional revenue shar-
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ing), and PCI is regional revenues. The 
result proved the occurrence of flypaper 
effect. 
2. Deller and Maher (2005) conducted a 
study of 572 cities in Wisconsin, in-
cluding towns and villages, by using a 
cross section for a time period of 1998-
2000. They invented and used the fol-
lowing model: 
PCE = 
0
 + 
1
 SSRPC + 
2
 PCI + e 
where, PCE is regional expenditures, 
SSRPC is interregional revenue shar-
ing, and PCI is regional revenues.  
3. Sagbas and Saruç (2004) conducted a 
study of 52 provinces in Turkey by us-
ing a panel for a time period of 1995-
1998 and used the following model: 
EXP
it
 = a + 
1 
TAX
1it 
+ 
 2 
RES
2it 
+ 
it 
where, EXP is regional expenditures, 
TAX is regional taxes as regional reve-
nues, and RES ia revenue sharing. 
  
The three models above discovered 
the greater influences of transfer funds on 
regional expenditures than that of PAD on 
regional expenditures. It means that there is 
flypaper effect. It indicates that regional 
governments tended to just waiting for the 
transfer funds (grants) from the central 
government, and they didn’t try optimally 
to cultivate their potential resources for in-
creasing their PAD.  
However, a research by Pramuka 
(2011) showed the opposite result, i.e., 
there was no flypaper effect. It means that 
the allocation funds from central govern-
ment only served to support regional gov-
ernments in increasing their PAD. Regional 
governments should not rely their regional 
expenditures on general allocation funds 
which is in line with the goal of the central 
government grant. 
In brief, the framework of thought 
begins in flypaper effect. Flypaper effect is 
a condition where the rises in transfer funds 
tend to stimulate more strongly on spend-
ing or expenditures than the comparable 
rises in revenues. However, experts main-
tain that institutional factors predominantly 
result in a flypaper effect. For Oates 
(1988), institutional powers that emerge in 
budgeting processes are already sufficient 
to meet the theoretical norm for an occur-
rence of flypaper effect. Thus, it can be 
said that institutions have an influence on 
the relationship between PAD and uncondi-
tional grant after excluding public expendi-
tures and infrastructure expenditures. To be 
clearer, see Figure 1 below.  
Grounded in the framework of 
thought and the result of empirical studies 
of earlier researchers, the following hypo-
theses were proposed: (1) Institutions have 
influence on the relationships between un-
conditional grant and public expenditures; 
(2) Institutions have influence on the rela-
tionships between unconditional grant and 
infrastructure expenditures. 
 
 
Figure 1: Framework of Analysis 
28 	


 

Research method 
The research population was all districts 
(18)/municipalities (5) in Aceh Province. 
The research was conducted by a census 
method with secondary data in form of time 
series from 2008-2012, whereas cross sec-
tion data consisted of the 23 districts and 
municipalities, so that it pooled the data, 
i.e., a combination of time series data 
(2008-2012: 5 years) and cross section data 
of the 23 districts and municipalities. The 
process of combining intertemporal data 
(time series) and interpersonal data (cross 
section) is called pooling whereas the data 
generated was called pooled data or panel 
data. The data collection method used in 
the research was documentation, where the 
data was collected by gathering information 
from official documents published by gov-
ernments, e.g., Regional Autonomy Im-
plementation Monitoring Committee 
(KPPOD) and Directorate General of Fiscal 
Balance (DJPK). 
The data analysis method used was 
a multiple regression analysis method. 
Multiple regression analysis is an analysis 
using more than one independent variable. 
The equation model used was one that ana-
lyze the influence of transfer from expendi-
ture side, that is, public expenditures. Next, 
to test the flypaper effect in the Govern-
ment of Aceh Province, the study applied 
the model used by Sagbas and Saruç 
(2004). The study use a specification of log 
linear and the model was then specified in 
form of a model as follows: 
 
Log PB
it
= β
0
 + β
1
 logUG
it
 + β
2
 log PAD
it
 + 
β
3 
Ins
it
 + β
4 
{(logUG
it
) x (Ins
it
)} 
+ e
it 
(1) 
 
where, log PB is log of public expenditures, 
log UG is log of unconditional grant, log 
PAD is log of local income, Ins is the insti-
tution for which regional economic gover-
nance indexes serve as a proxy, and log 
UGINS is interaction of log UG and Ins. 
The equation also explains that the variable 
of log UG and Ins is a moderating variable 
that accounts for the influence of the mod-
erating variable of Ins on the relationship 
between log UG and log PB.  
Likewise, in analyzing the influence 
of transfer of infrastructure expenditures, 
the study followed earlier researches such 
as Deller and Maher (2005). The study was 
carried out based on a panel data model to 
examine flypaper effect. In dealing with the 
issue, the study used a specification of log 
linear and then the model was specified in a 
form of the following model: 
 
Log PI
it
 = 
0
 + 
1
 logUG
it
 + 
2
 log PAD
it
 + 

3 
Ins
it
 + 
4 
{(logUG
it
) x (Ins
it
)} 
+ µ
it. 
(2)
  
 
where, log PI is log of infrastructure ex-
penditures, log UG is log of unconditional 
grant, log PAD is log of local income, Ins 
is the institution for which regional eco-
nomic governance indexes serve as a 
proxy, and log UGINS is interaction of log 
UG and Ins. The equation also explains that 
the variable of log UG and Ins is a mod-
erating variable that accounts for the influ-
ence of the moderating variable of Ins on 
the relationship between log UG and log 
PI. 
Based on equation 1 and 2, it is ex-
pected that flypaper effect can be obtained 
by the value of the coefficient of uncondi-
tional grant that is greater than that of the 
coefficient of revenue. Conversely, if the 
coefficient of unconditional grant is smaller 
than that of the coefficient of revenue, fly-
paper effect doesn’t occur.  
 
Result and discussion 
The components of PAD consist of region-
al tax, local user charges, and other legal 
PAD. In a framework of the implementa-
tion of regional autonomy, PAD is the most 
strategic indicator in seeing the map of the 
regional government capacity to finance its 
development, as well as a picture of the 
self-sufficiency of a regional government. 
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From the four PAD components, regional 
tax and retribution expectedly play the big-
gest roles.  
The comparison between the total 
PAD and total regional revenues (TPD) is 
called fiscal decentralization degree ratio. 
This ratio indicates the degree of PAD con-
tribution to total regional revenues. The 
higher the contribution of PAD is, the 
higher the capacity of regional government 
is in implementing decentralization. The 
capacity of local government as computed 
from the ratio of PAD and total regional 
revenue could be seen in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Fiscal Decentralization Degree of 
Aceh Province 
Year The ratio of PAD to TPD 
2008 3,56 
2009 3,58 
2010 6,91 
2011 5,53 
2012 6,03 
Average 5,12 
 
The table above shows that the av-
erage ratio of PAD and total regional reve-
nue was 5.12%. Though the ratio was con-
stantly fluctuating, regional financial ca-
pacity of Aceh Province government was 
very weak, being in a decentralization de-
gree interval scale of 0.00 – 10.00. The rea-
son is that there was a dependence of re-
gional finance on the balance funds from 
the central government which was ever in-
creasing from year to year. It implies that 
the government of Aceh Province couldn’t 
yet optimize its own potentials. 
In line with the implementation of 
regional autonomy and fiscal decentraliza-
tion in 2001, fund transfers from APBN 
(national budget) to local governments are 
allocated in form of balance funds. These 
transfers are aimed at (1) reducing fiscal 
discrepancy between central and local gov-
ernments and (2) enhancing the quality of 
public services in local governments and 
reducing interregional discrepancies of 
public services. Relating to this, for the ra-
tio of dependence, i.e., a comparison be-
tween the amount of transfer revenues and 
total regional revenues (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Ratio of Dependence 
in Aceh Province 
Year Income transfer to TPD 
2008 91,32 
2009 89,87 
2010 88,36 
2011 87,38 
2012 89,38 
Average 89,26 
 
Table 3 shows that the transfer rev-
enues from the central government and to-
tal regional revenues were slightly fluctuat-
ing. The average ratio was 89.26% indicat-
ing that the dependence on transfer funds 
from the central government was very high. 
If the percentage is greater than 50.01% 
then it indicates that the regional govern-
ment is still not optimal in utilizing its 
transfer funds for investment to increase its 
PAD. 
The development of regional ex-
penditures can be seen from a harmonious-
ness ratio. The ratio indicates the capacity 
of regional government in prioritizing op-
timally its fund allocations to public and 
routine expenditures. The higher the per-
centage of funds allocated to routine ex-
penditures is, the smaller the percentage of 
the public expenditures used to provide 
economic facilities and infrastructures will 
be. For more detail, see Table. 
The table showed that the percen-
tages of public (PB) and operating expendi-
tures (PR) were fluctuating slightly, though 
there were increases in term of budget. In 
general, the regional government tended to 
increase public facilities and infrastructures 
in attempt to boost the local economy. It 
could be seen from the percentages of pub-
lic expenditures that received a larger pro-
portion than the routine expenditures did. 
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Table 4: Harmonization Ratio in Aceh Province 
Year Public Expenditure Percentage Operating Expenditure Percentage 
2008 4.216.742 61,77 2.609.727 38,23 
2009 5.932.918 61,61 3.696.304 38,39 
2010 5.780.874 54,77 4.773.191 45,23 
2011 7.105.420 56,77 5.410.230 43,23 
2012 8.000.527 53,73 6.889.060 46,27 
 
Figure 2: An Index of Regional Economic Governance 
 
 
Meanwhile, the institutions from 
regional economic governance side could 
be seen on Figure 2. The figure showed that 
in 2012 Sabang Municipality fell into a cat-
egory of the best economic governance, 
i.e., 84, whereas the worst economic go-
vernance was Aceh Jaya, 35. KPPOD 
(2007) identified some constraints such as 
the barriers that arose from regional gov-
ernment programs in developing private 
enterprises, land accesses, and legal uncer-
tainty. Moreover, there were still some ob-
structions in interactions between regional 
government and entrepreneurs, inefficiency 
of regional retributions, business license 
affairs, security and conflict resolution, and 
the integrity of regents/mayors. 
 In addition to the result of 
description as presented above, it also 
needs to see the result of regression to an-
swer the hypothesis. The result of regres-
sion could be seen in Table 5. The result of 
estimation showed that flypaper effect can 
be found from the coefficient of uncondi-
tional grant that influences significantly to 
public expenditures, i.e., an increase of 1 
percent in unconditional grant cause an in-
crease 0.74 percent in public expenditures, 
compared to only 0.26 percent in PAD. 
 
Table 5: The result of Estimated Public Expenditures 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
LOGUG 0.747266 0.084178 8.877.176* 
LOGPAD 0.265004 0.106594 2.486.095* 
INS 0.023354 0.004478 5.215.335* 
LUGUGINS -0.003882 0.00959 -4.050.162* 
R-square 0,730025   
   Note: * significant at 5% significance level 
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Table 6: The result of Estimated Infrastructure Expenditures 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
LOGUG 0.488666 0.025776 18.95844 
LOGPAD 0.386639 0.032805 11.78612 
INS 0.066066 0.004979 13.26916 
LUGUGINS -0.010870 0.00099 -10.97928 
R-square 0.483335   
   Note: * significant at 5% significance level 
 
In addition, institutions influenced 
the increases in public expenditures. It 
could be seen when the variable was mod-
erated, the result shows that institutions 
were capable of reducing the use of uncon-
ditional grant by 0.743384 percent, due to 
the role the institutions played in optimiz-
ing PAD. However, this decrease in trans-
fer was still smaller. Therefore, in the fu-
ture, institutions should be optimized fur-
ther by various pro-growth programs and 
activities, such as by developing regional 
special products. 
The estimation result on the Table 6 
above indicated that flypaper effect can be 
found from the amount of unconditional 
grant that influences significantly infrastruc-
ture expenditures, i.e., an increase of 1 per-
cent in unconditional grant caused an in-
crease 0.48 percent in infrastructure expend-
itures, compared to 0.38 percent in PAD. 
In addition, institutions influenced 
the increases in infrastructure expenditures. 
It could be seen when the variable was 
moderated, the result showed that institu-
tions were capable of reducing the use of 
unconditional grant by 0.477796 percent, 
due to the role the institutions played in 
optimizing PAD. However, this decrease in 
transfer was still small. Therefore, in the 
future, institutions should be optimized fur-
ther by various pro-growth programs and 
activities, such as by developing regional 
special products.  
 
Conclusion 
Flypaper effect has an impact on the in-
creases in public expenditures and in other 
public sectors such as infrastructure ex-
penditures, because regional governments 
responded more to transfer funds than to 
PAD in increasing their expenditures. In 
addition, institutional factors have some 
influence on the increases in public ex-
penditures. It could be seen when the vari-
able was moderated, the result of which 
showed that institutions were capable of 
reducing the use of unconditional grant, 
due to the role the institutions played in 
optimizing PAD. Based on the research 
findings the local governments should allo-
cate their budgets as efficient as possible to 
the programs and activities in the sectors 
that based on the public or community in-
terests so that the regional government can 
increase their PAD. 
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